America – The Public Diplomacy of Freeing the National Wealth to only the Few in the Land of the Free.
America, a country that considered itself as the richest on earth, where dreams are realised, but also a country home to close to Fifty million peoples without healthcare and living in poverty. While Wall Street keeps piling up their profits year in, year out, and can even afford to fail, and be rescued in the blink of an eye, Main Street only rely on/or wish for divine or family intervention.
Capitalism is only embraced if one wears a suit and tie, works for the corporate world or be part of the decision-making process.
Despite the richest 1 per cent owning 37 per cent ($20 trillion) of wealth, the public diplomacy flag bearers (U.S. government, the right wing media, and the corporate industry) have still manage to speak the language they speak best (America the Land of the Free – but free for who, America the country where hard work pays – to legitimise gross inequalities, America where the individual is responsible for his/her own destiny – as they bid to divide the haves-not, make them feel responsible for their lack of healthcare cover and dependence on food stamps).
The U.S. tax system now raises less from millionaires and corporations than it did 50 years ago. Thus, the state of affairs in America.
References
Institute for Policy Studies. (2011). We’re Not Broke, Just Twisted: Extreme Wealth Inequality in America. Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpbRXXntGM8. Last accessed 4th May 2012.
A critical review of the report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy
US Department of State, September 2005
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: THE LINCHPIN OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
(http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf)
This report commissioned by Congress in March 2004, and published by the U.S. State Department in 2005, was charged with advising the Secretary of State on programs and policies to advance the use of cultural diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy. The report paid particular emphasis on enhancing the very best of American culture, strengthening the profile of its creative and artistic personnels abroad. Developing strategies for increasing public-private sector partnerships to sponsor cultural exchange programs that promote the national interest of the United States, was also a key emphasis to the report.
The report very explicitly, and without prejudice, outlines the contribution of cultural diplomacy in America’s past political endeavours, address the misconceptions, as well as shared light on how its usage can play an integral role in solving or tackling America’s current and future problems and challenges.
Bearing in mind, the under-representation of, or the peripheral role of cultural diplomacy in the foreign policy decision-making process of the United States in recent times, this report, chaired by prominent scholars and personnels in the field of diplomacy, signalled a fundamental shift, one that aimed to fully utilize the essence and tools of cultural diplomacy.
Contrary to the current inhospitable attitudes towards cultural diplomacy within the American political system, cultural diplomacy has historically (as demonstrated during the Cold War period), being an inherent feature in America’s foreign policy. Indeed, the values, ideals and practices of the forefathers have played a great role in shaping as well as being a major feature in U.S. foreign policy. However, its application in recent times, has, at best, being largely confined to pursuing short-term political goals and practices that undermine or compromise the true practices of cultural diplomacy (cultural exchange and understanding).
Taking into consideration, the current nature of the international environment, the current state of affairs, the dynamics and scope of current security threats (Terrorism, and a likelihood of Nuclear Proliferation by rogue states, for example), and future challenges, this report, which some may argue as well over due, has, nonetheless, in setting out to place cultural diplomacy at the heart of America’s foreign policy, made a compelling case for not only the need for genuine effective use of diplomacy, but also, highlights the consequences that may arise from failing to incorporate or utilize it as a foreign policy tool.
In sum, although part of the recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy emphasize the need to expand international cultural exchange, but the need for a heavy concentration of resources and an emphasis on partnership with the private sector who may be motivated by creativity and artistic value thus, risked it being commercialized.
Furthermore, the report places far too much emphasis on the promotion of, and the implementation of strategies largely aimed at boosting the national interests of the United States. It concentrated less on advancing the understanding of the cultures of the international community – the basic principle of, and arguably, the most viable way of conducting cultural diplomacy. Thus, making the prospect of a feasible and sustainable cultural diplomacy initiative highly unlikely.
References
Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. (2005). CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: THE LINCHPIN OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. Available: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf. Last accessed 5th May 2012.
Originally available in German as „Bericht zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2005/2006“ by Auswärtiges Amt
The report under review was published by the German Federal Foreign Office (FFO) in mid-2006 in order to review the developments, projects and events undertaken by the FFO and its partners with regard to foreign cultural relations in the past two years.[1] In its three parts, the report (1) presents the aims and foundations of German cultural diplomacy, (2) reviews the different fields of activity giving many diverse real-world examples and (3) introduces partner organizations the FFO works with and supports, such as the Goethe Institute.
Considering the vagueness sometimes attached to the label of cultural diplomacy, due to its conceptual weakness associated with the lack of clear boundaries between ‘normal’ cultural activities and cultural activities with a clear diplomatic aim, the report tries to tackle this issue by making the label conditional on the activities’ contribution to a threefold set of aims: the creation of reliable partners and networks abroad, the improvement of Germany’s competitiveness by attracting professionals or researchers from abroad and the projection of a timely image of Germany as a nation with a multifaceted and internationally renowned cultural scene, ready to tackle its past in a credible way.[2]
Further, for a nation lacking a word for this very activity, Germany seems to have taken on board some of the lessons of the ‘new public diplomacy’,[3] by emphasizing the importance of listening and exchange, believing that an open cultural dialogue will be able to address the conflict potential arising from the clash of different cultural values.[4] Making direct reference to the negative impact of the Mohammed cartoons, the report examines the new effort to engage with the Islamic world, praising the approach to counter misunderstandings through concrete joint efforts in the cultural realm. A theatre project in Iran in which German and Iranian actors collaborated to put on a critical play in Teheran, followed by a world tour, is exemplary of the attempt to address problems by creatively engaging with them together.[5]
Images from the joint German-Iranian Theatre Play
Moreover, the concept of a cultural “Year of Germany” as a prime way of creating a positive German image is introduced, designed to offer a comprehensive impression of German culture, economy, research and education. Two recent initiatives in Japan and Poland saw the organization of over 1000 events in each country, including the promotion of German goods and lifestyle by young volunteers, concerts by German bands and joint artistic competitions,[6] and have thus exhibited a strong focus on personal interactions. Germany thus seems to have taken on board a second lesson: government voices do not necessarily carry the same legitimacy as personal interactions with citizens.
Images from the ‘Year of Germany’ in Japan and Poland
The report further establishes the efforts to promote the German language[7], through the support of German schools and action kits to improve existing German classes, as exemplified by the Transatlantic-Outreach-Program targeting the US and Canada;[8] highlights the important contribution of the German Broadcasting service Deutsche Welle;[9] and notes the need to rely more and more on local non-state actors and established partner organisations in order toreact more flexibly to demand on the ground.[10]
Given this very broad and insightful review of activities undertaken, it is somewhat disappointing that the report does not make any reference to a theoretical underpinning of its activities and shows no awareness of the existing discourse on public diplomacy. Further, it establishes no connection between the advancement of the stated aims of cultural diplomacy and the outcomes of the various activities. While every activity is attributed to a specific aim, there is no critical, measurable evaluation of their impact. In order to prove the efficacy of different approaches and to allocate funds to those that work best, it would be necessary, for example, to observe a change in the pattern of immigration of the desired bright individuals into Germany after a promotional display, or to conduct an opinion poll amongst Japanese and Polish citizens before and after the ‘Year of Germany.’ Lastly, the report allocates but some ten lines to the use of modern media, after having spent pages discussing print and audio.[11] With the link to its own cultural diplomacy homepage being outdated, this shows a regrettable negligence with regard to modern tools of communication which can be a major asset for states trying to promote a modern image aboard.
To come to a conclusion, this report is a valuable source of information for anyone interested in the practice of German cultural diplomacy and it provides a detailed overview of existing projects and motivations. However, it is lacking in analytical rigour and neglects the importance of modern communication efforts. While the former can be excused by the nature of the report, which is indeed not a critical evaluation, but a government document designed to inform rather than to analyse, the latter issue needs to be addressed, especially in the light of Germany’s desire to project a modern and timely image.
For an interesting short video about Germany’s take on P2P diplomacy (with English subtitles):
110530_StM_Pieper_AKBP.html?nn=476558
[1] p.4 – all references are to pages within the report, unless otherwise specified.
In German, there is no word for either public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy. Yet, in a recent publication in English, the FFO establishes that if it refers to cultural relations or foreign cultural policy in German, it does so in the sense of cultural diplomacy:
[2] p.5 and p.6
[3] Cull, Nicholas J., ‘Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons for its Future from its Past’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6.1 (2010) 11–17
[4] p.7
[5] p.26
[6] p.6
[7] p.22
[8] p.3
[9] p.29
[10] p.9
[11] p.3
This report has been produced by the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee to the US Department of Homeland Security whose mission is to protect America’s security, economic livelihood, ideals, image, and strategic relationships with the world. The term Secure Borders and Open Doors suggests the goal of interviewing, processing, analysing and welcoming international visitors as well as finding those who wish to use the US’s ‘openness’ against them. The report describes the challenges that the attacks on 9/11 created to such industries and institutions that relied on the international mobility and interaction of Americans with citizens from around the world. There has been a struggle to increase security on the physical and virtual borders whilst at the same time maintain the freedom and openness of which the US is known for. As the visa process has changed and become known around the world overseas travel declined 17% in 2000-2006 with two million less visitors from the UK, Japan, Germany and France. The Secure Borders and Open Doors vision, or the Rice-Chertoff Initiative (RCI), has reflected a renewed effort to enhance the attractiveness of the US to international tourists, students, and businesspeople whilst preventing adversaries from entering.
There is emphasis on the direct interactions between Americans and residents of other countries to Public Diplomacy, rather than the portrayal of the US through film, TV, music and sports; it is noted that this travel experience often escapes the notice of reporters and political experts. In terms of international students the report draws attention to the fact that there was an increase of 3% in enrolment 2006-2007 yet it has still lost students when other major competitors such as UK, France and Australia have experienced growth.
The report also relates Public Diplomacy to a new public-private partnership which includes representatives of the travel industry and business community to change perceptions about the US visa and entry process and promote US as a top visiting destination. The report advises that improvements be made to the educationusa.state.gov website to become a better tool for American Public Diplomacy and that the role of Public Diplomacy be an independent effort to engage all sectors of American society in improving world opinion.
The report draws attention to the metrics and critical success factors which have not been utilized. This is due to many reasons including the fact that some of the metrics that should be used for rational management and deployment of resources are considered politically sensitive, particularly those dealing with countries considered unfriendly to the US. Yet the typical responding traveller noted that the courtesy with which they were dealt through immigration was slightly better than ‘average’, not ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. Finally it is noted the those travellers who may feel most strongly about unfair treatment may be the ones who contribute most to negative views and attitudes of the USA.
The critical link that the Department of Homeland Security is making between immigration and Public Diplomacy should be commended. The report notes its success on the way it not only deters and detects adversaries to the US but also that by treating visitors with dignity and respect US security will be reinforced, and crucially that human interaction is required as
‘…each visitor to the United States represents such an opportunity.’
However, this report largely overstates the importance of the attacks of 9/11 to the individual visitor and most importantly it assumes that a citizen of a foreign nation is ignorant to the ‘American ideals’ of democratic freedom, private enterprise, human rights, intellectual pursuits and technological achievement and is accepting of persuasion. This comes to light when the US is described as
“…an international beacon of freedom and economic opportunities…offering unique and attractive opportunities for international businesspeople, students, researchers, and tourists, America has long been a premier destination for people from all over the world.”
And reiterated in the comment
“A world that admires America is more likely to welcome and value American goods and services.”
The report recommends that the Federal government and the private sector work together to establish a national-level strategic communications campaign to promote the US as the premier visitor destination in the world as well as articulating and implementing a policy for attracting international students. Although this international outreach cannot be understated there should be caution when tying this outreach so close to the US government, as after all that is where the international mistrust lies.
It is interesting that this reports also notes that
“Every international traveller entering the United States is a potential friend of the United States.”
Of particular importance is the stress that after visiting the US foreign citizens have improved their perceptions of the country, American people and even the policies compared to what they believed before.
What should take greater prominence in this report is ensuring the international knowledge and cross-cultural skills of Americans. This is mentioned when the report recommends that by increasing the number of Americans that study abroad to 1 million a year the skills and relationships gained would become a major asset to Public Diplomacy in the future.
Finally the reports suggests large scale surveys around the world to understand the public attitude towards the US in order to determine the influence of visa and entry processes, even though it is admitted that this would not be an easy task it must be argued that this is almost too outrageous and overambitious.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_SBODACreport508-compliant_version2.pdf
Section II: Critical Review of a Recent Report
‘Cultural Diplomacy-The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy’
A Report by the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (US department of State, 2005).
The report comes at a time when America’s diplomactic relations and its moral standing was under criticism after the unfolding of its war on terrror. The invasion of Iraq and the shocking incidents of U.S heavyhandeness in the case of Abu Gharib incidents showed the ‘erosion of trust and credibility’ and seemingly failure of U.S. initiatives to win the minds and heart of muslim community (Report of the advisory committee on cultural diplomacy 2005, p.7). Noting, the lack of traditional public support for art and cultural diplomacy during peace time, it suggest creation of enduring structures for the practice of effective cultural diplomacy seeing its role in enhancing security of the contry (ibid. 1). The report sees culture as ‘point of access and interest, opening doors when certain doors are closed for political reasons’ (ibid. 15). Evidently, the report notes the need for long term commitment for cultural diplomacy initiatives highlighting the importance of the role culture can play in U.S public diplomacy.
Further, the report highlights many role of cultural diplomacy notably fostering the growth of civil society, providing neutral platform for people-to-people contact, counterbalancing misunderstanding, hatred and terrorism, and providing positive agenda for cooperation in spite of policy difference among others. Similarly, its recommendations are many, calling for increase funding for public diplomacy, fund for translation projects, and most importantly to expand international cultural exchange programs with the Islamic world [ibid. pp.17- 18].
Evidently, many of its findings and recommendations stress the importance of cultural aspect in public diplomacy for strengthening America’s image and subsequent result in securing U.S. interest abroad. However, in instance it appears rhetorical without showing practical ways of evaluating such initiatives. For instance, use of culture to counterbalancing misunderstanding, hatred and terrorism effectively hide the overall failure of the government policies. It is seen necessary that public diplomacy must be used as a preventive rather than counter-balancing strategy. The use of cultural guise behind hidden national agenda might end up undermining the very role culture out to play in building confidence and mutual understanding among different communities. Insofar, considering the nature of political environment and the current rift between supposedly western culture and Islamic world, for instance, the call for growth of civil society [part of the democratization agenda], ends up embedding culture in national agenda which might prove counter- productive.
However, from a differing perspective, the report highlights important discrepancies in U.S. public diplomacy and many of its recommendations if followed with the rights intentions along with proper evaluation mechanism might strengthen the need for cultural sensitiveness in its dealings with the Muslim world. As such one could argue that the report makes a compelling case for highlighting the importance of culture in America’s public diplomacy initiatives to win the minds and heart of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, it is seen important to have effective mechanism to monitor and evaluate progress in the said field. However, for cultural diplomacy to be successful the report rightly highlights the need for long-term commitment and one could add that such initiatives must not be guided by temporary political agenda of the government. [550]
Reference.
Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (2005), ‘Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy’, U.S Department of State September 2005.pp.1-28. Available from < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf> [25th April 2012]
Having focused on t
he new developments and novel concepts associated with the new public diplomacy in my earlier blogs, it feels like coming full circle by addressing one of the oldest and still most contentious issues associated with public diplomacy: Is it simply a euphemism for propaganda, designed to invoke more positive associates by changing a name but keeping the same practice?
The term ‘propaganda’ can be traced back to 1622 and is linked to the Sacred Congregation for Propagating the Faith established by Pope Gregory XV. Much like now, the aim of this initiative was to “convince large numbers of people about the veracity of a given set of ideas.” Yet, the term propaganda is now bound to leave a particularly bitter aftertaste for it has become increasingly associated with the attempts to demonise enemies and spread politically calculated lies of the German Nazi regime or First World War and Cold War propaganda campaigns.[1]
Is public diplomacy thus simply a clever euphemism for the very same activity, trying to shake off the negative images associated with it by changing but the label? Seeing that Gullion, who coined the term public diplomacy, implies as much,[2] and that both concepts are inherently difficult to define there is a certain logic in arguing that they are indeed the same. Both are intended to influence public opinion, neither is altruistic, designed to serve a certain country’s interest, and both can achieve credibility, as Brown argues.
Yet, he goes on to establish, that, in their most extreme varieties, they differ significantly in terms of the methods they employ. While propaganda “at its worst” will force its messages on an audience, will engage in demonization of the other and glorification of the self and will not shy away from distorting the truth to the extent of lying, public diplomacy “at its best” will attempt to explain foreign policy objectives in a factual and honest way and will encourage mutual understanding by listening.
Kruckeberg and Vujnovic also particularly highlight two-way communication as being part of the ideal form of public diplomacy[3] which makes it fundamentally different from propaganda, which, in all it varieties, from white to black propaganda, is focused solely on transmitting a predetermined message to an audience.
Accordingly, we can concede that originally, public diplomacy may indeed just have been a new way of dressing a concept which is “as old as people, politics and religion.” Their ultimate aim, too, may be the same. Yet, as the concept of public diplomacy has evolved from its 1965 roots and learned some of the lessons discussed in previous posts and outlined with unparalleled precision by Cull,[4] it moved closer to its “best”, according to Brown, and further away from its communalities with propaganda.
Yet, in the light of the controversy surrounding a clip by the Chinese state TV channel supposedly showing footage of a Chinese fighter jet which was then revealed to be taken directly from the movie ‘Top Gun’, some countries still seem inclined to sometimes slide back into old habits of propaganda and half-truths and it is difficult to draw the line between where bad public diplomacy might end and propaganda might begin. It can therefore be expected that this controversial question will continue to cause debate.
[1] Lilleker, Darren G., Key Concepts in Political Communication (London: Sage Publications, 2006), p.163
[2] Berridge, G.R. (2010) Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 4th ed., Palgrave, Basingstoke
[3] Kruckeberg, Dean and Vujnovic, Marina, ‘Public Relations, Not Propaganda, for US Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: Challenges and Opportunities”, Journal of Communication Management, 9.4 (2005), 296-304, p.302
[4] Cull, Nicholas J., ‘Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons For its Future from its Past’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6.1 (2010), 11-17
It is evident that the post- ‘9/11’ revival of interest in US public diplomacy includes a wide ranging notions, most of which are critical. The unprecedented drop in U.S. standing in world public opinion due to its infamous ‘war on terror’ suggests fundamental flaws in US public diplomacy efforts and a clear sign that they were ineffective.
It is argued that the much has to be learnt from experiences of the cold War-era standing of public diplomacy. The spread of liberal democracy behind the Berlin Walls were seen to be aided by mass communication channels like the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and that cultural exchanges with influential members of Soviet society helped create the foundation that undermined the communist regime. Insofar, America’s informational campaigns were seen instrumental in hastening the fall of the Soviet Union. Lord and Dale (2007), maintains that with the end of cold war, U.S communication machinery is seen to be underpowered and not engaged effectively with the global ideological environment (Lord and Dale 2007, p. 1). They argue that to restore America’s voce, government leaders should draw on the nation’s Cold War legacy to build the foundation in promotion dialogue with foreign audience, nurture institutional relations and share ideas – all seen as important aspect of national security. Acknowledging the importance of idea, they call for America’s leaders to draw on lessons from cold war strategies to rebuild the nation’s public diplomacy capabilities (ibid. pp.6-7).
However there is much scepticism in ascertaining the degree to which the Cold War’s campaign of information, influence and engagement could be viewed as success. Reflecting upon the dynamic of the new geopolitical environment there are many forward-thinking propositions which follow different schools of thoughts.
Firstly, it is accepted that the advance in international communication technologies heralded by the new ‘information age’ saw changes in ways people obtain and share information. Secondly, it can be noted that increasingly culture as oppose to ideology is seen as a basis for transmitting messages among foreign populations (Kelly 2007, pp 74-76).
Furthermore, it is maintained that as cultural difference rather than nationalism is a contemporary account of miscommunication between peoples, as such the logic of targeting public diplomacy to a sovereign state with distinct polity and hierarchy of leadership is turned obsolete. Therefore even with communication engagement, without a base of cultural knowledge from which initiatives can be developed, fitting a information content to adhere to tastes and habits is seen more complex compared to the cold war era ( ibid. 77).
Nevertheless it is argued that problems facing public diplomacy will require long-term solutions. There are calls for more focus on ‘exchange of ideas’ between the U.S public diplomacy apparatus and especially the Muslim world. It is maintained that Cold War histories that deal with certain aspects of public diplomacy can contribute from experience of programs and activities which are on way to be forgotten now. Through a meticulous record of such success and failures, it is argued U.S government can emulate the achievements and avoid past mistakes (Critchlow 2006, p. 89).
Bibliography:
Critchlow, J. (2006), ‘Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The Records and Its Implcation’, ‘Journal of Cold War Studies’, (1)6, pp. 75-89. Available from <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/152039704772741597?prevSearch=allfield%253A%2528%255Ball%253A%2Bcritchlow%2Bpublic%2Bdiplomacy%2Bduring%2Bthe%2Bcold%2Bwar%255D%2529&searchHistoryKey=> [17th March 2012]
Kelley, John R. (2007), ‘US Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Success Story?’, ‘The Hague Journal of Diplomacy’ (1) 2, pp.53-79.
Lord, C. And Dale, Helle C. (2007), ‘Public Diplomacy and the Cold War: Lesson Learned’, ‘Backgrounder’ No.2070, September 2007, The Heritage Foundation, Massachusetts Avenue. Available from <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/09/public-diplomacy-and-the-cold-war-lessons-learned> [20th March 2012]
Shaw, (2012), Nightmare on Nevsky Prospekt: The Blue Bird as a Curious Instance of U.S.-Soviet Film Collaboration during the Cold War’, ‘Journal of Cold War Studies’, (1)14, pp. 3-33.
Zaharna, R. S (2010), ‘Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy After 9/11’, Palgrave, Macmillan.
Propaganda can be stated as an umbrella term covering all forms of persuasive communication, including advertising and public relations. As a label it suffered (and suffers) from certain imprecision and might be regarded among few words in English language which carry as many ethical intonations.
Furthermore, it can be thought as a use of expression-form in such a way to ensure rapid dissemination of ideas through graphic symbols, music, spectacle and combination of words charged with emotions. Propagandists make impression upon the masses of people and the information may be wholly or partially ‘true’, confusing, or ‘false’. Propaganda manifest as an effect of secrecy and censorship and selective release of information is intent on serving or promoting the interests of those in power. The state owned and controlled press broadcasting institutions can be used for propaganda purposes as in the case in Nazi Germany or during Stalin in Soviet Union.
Bernays (2005) suggests that in theory, every citizen make their mind on public issues and matters of private conduct. Yet, in practice, we have voluntarily agreed to let an invisible government to sift the abstruse economics, political, and ethical judgement involved in every issues thereby narrowing our field of choice to practical proportions (p.38). Nevertheless, some of the phenomenon of this process such as manipulation of news, the inflation of personality, and the general commotion by which political or commercial products or social ideas are brought into public awareness can be criticised. However, though this kind of instrument of organising public opinion may be misused, such organization and focusing are seen necessary for an orderly life (ibid. P39).
Duke (2006) provides interesting insight into the US Defence Department engagement of a systematic black propaganda program following the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003. It is maintained that the Pentagon contracted the Washington-based Lincoln Group to complement the military’s psychological operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The propaganda mechanisms include tactics like planting favourable news articles in the Iraqi news media (cited in Guth 2009 p.12). Similarly, the case study of both the Afghan and Iraq war undeniably suggest that the Bush government did engaged in all shades of propaganda not only to deceive domestic audience but targeted audience of these countries to serve US government interest. However, the psychological operation tactic employed to demoralize the Taliban and winning the support of Afghan people through institutions like the CIC or the OSI has shown to be ineffective as a long term strategy.
Evidently, in the case of Iraq war it can be argued that domestic public has been target of biased and persuading information with negative targeting of Iraq such as Saddam possessing weapon of mass destruction. Nevertheless, it can be noted that the role and direction of U.S. overseas information has seen divergent opinion and those aligned with the military tended to take a more tactical approach. On the other hand journalist and public relations practitioners tend to prefer the strategic approach favouring the use of white propaganda though they distance themselves from the term (Guth 2009, 13).
Nevertheless, Black (2001) suggests that it is possible to conduct public relations, advertising, and persuasion campaigns, plus the vast range of informational journalism efforts, without being unduly propagandistic ((Black 2001, p. 15).
A fully functioning democratic society needs pluralism in its persuasion and information albeit narrow-minded self-serving propaganda that the modern media savvy audience members unconsciously or uncritically consume. The mutual exclusiveness of open-mindedness and mass communication is seen highly important.
Bibliography:
Black, J. (2001), ‘Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda’, ‘Journal of Mass Media Ethics’, [online] (2/3) 16, pp.121–137. Available from <http://0-web.ebscohost.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =d626b51c-cf04-4ea3-949d-439f39f60859%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=106 > [18th March 2012]
Bernays, Edward L. (2005), ‘Propaganda/Edward Bernays; with an introduction by Mark Crispin Miller’, Brooklyn NY, Ig Publishing.
Guth, David W. (2008), ‘Black, White, and Shades of Gray: The Sixty-Year Debate over Propaganda versus Public Diplomacy’, ‘Journal of Promotion Management’, [online] (3/4) 14, pp. 309-325. Available from <http://0-web.ebscohost.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =7fedb6ee-fa31-4b7c-b953-48d09e8d2c14%40sessionmgr114&vid=1&hid=123> [18th March 2012]
Sennett, A. (2009), ‘Play It Again, Uncle Sam: Casablanca & US Foreign Policy’, ‘Journal of Popular Film & Television’, [online] (1) 37, pp 2-8. Available from
< http://0-web.ebscohost.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =8fcb977b-90d7-4c98-b8fc-9909ceede910%40sessionmgr114&vid=1&hid=123> [101h March 2012]
SORRY I WAS UNABLE TO COMMENT UNDER THE POST…HOPE YOU SEE THIS
Isabelletreat I found this blog very insightful and think you drew on some important issues especially in regards to a new focus on domestic populations, and as Cull argues Public Diplomacy is not exclusive to government officials but requires citizen effort too.
I would like to simply add to what you have said by referring to a publication by Kathy R. Fitzpatrick ‘U.S Public Diplomacy’s neglected domestic mandate’ (http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesNeglectedMandate.pdf).
Fitzpatrick begins with a quote that I think addresses the issue completely, “Ignorance of the world is a national liability” (Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton).
She then traces this U.S Public Diplomacy’s neglected domestic mandate to the beginning of the Cold War. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act in 1948 was set up to increase a mutual understanding of the US in other countries (this led to the creation of the United States Information Agency). However, at its inception there were never any instructions on how mutual understanding would be achieved at home. This ideal of mutual understanding thus remained just that, an ideal. Fitzpatrick argues that as a result today Americans have turned inward and there is an overwhelming focus on domestic concerns as the interest in foreign affairs that was prominent during the Cold War has been neglected. This could be down to the fear of propaganda or mistrust in the government, however it is vital for the US with an increasing reputation around the world for being ignorant to step up its game in ensuring mutual understanding really does become mutual, and listening has as much importance as talking.
Comparing the Public and Cultural Diplomacy of two states is fascinating and leads to a great deal of insight in to their foreign policy aims and targets. Observing non-state actor’s involvement in Public and Cultural Diplomacy likewise provides an interesting take on the methods in which Public and Cultural Diplomacy can be conducted; however there is a lot of scepticism around where we draw the line on who we can call actors. NATO and the EU are organisations that are made up of member states. Any form of Public and Cultural Diplomacy therefore must be analysed as a body working together, and the focus of the Diplomacy (the receiving state) and ‘projects’ undertaken are completely relevant to the different organisations.
One of the differences that can be observed between NATO and the EU is that the EU has a much more decentralised style towards Public and Cultural Diplomacy compared to the centralised style of NATO. This can be seen on their websites where there is a striking difference in structure and management.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C6770349-89151C91/natolive/structure.htm
The European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) seeks ‘to facilitate cultural co-operation’ with members working in over 150 countries. This is based on the notion that the EU is multicultural and not only prides itself in this but brands itself as diverse. The EUNIC network describes itself as an active network, a learning network, a partnering network and an advocacy network. By drawing on this diversity it centres its activities on the ‘Language Rich Europe’. One of these projects is ‘Projects – From Routes to Roots: Transnational writings in contemporary Europe (http://www.eunic-online.eu/node/430)’. This was held at a university in Victoria, Australia in 2011, and involved three authors form Germany, Italy and the UK who reflected ‘the transnational’ in a contemporary Europe. They discussed their work and debated with the audience to draw attention to how global migration and the legacy of colonialism has brought new communities to Europe, resulting in the evolving face of Europe made up of transnational identities.
Unlike the strong focus on culture by the EU, NATO has a strong Public Diplomacy division. This Public Diplomacy division includes a NATO Multimedia Library, Fellowship and Sponsorship programmes, a NATO information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine and a NATO Information Office in Moscow, Russia (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C6770349-89151C91/natolive/structure.htm). Among the Fellowship and Sponsorship programmes is the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) (http://www.nato.int/science/about_sps/nato_russia.htm), and among the programmes in the SPS is a programme of support between scientists and experts from Russia and NATO countries. This programme brings these different experts together to work on issues such as defence against terrorist threats and countering threats to security such as environmental, disaster threats or modelling sustainable consumption, food security and biotechnology. This NATO-Russia cooperation promotes, encourages and co-ordinates joint co-operative nationally funded projects, involving experts from NATO countries and Russia.
These two examples of Public and Cultural Diplomacy by the EU and NATO make very different use of academia to bring the organisations closer together with non-member countries. I can’t help but consider the specific focus of NATO on Russia and Eastern Europe in the Public Diplomacy division reflects the Public and Cultural Diplomacy of the USA during the Cold War yet it also reflects the fact that NATO is a collective defence organisation whereas EU encompasses a lot more than that. An ordinary civilian from a country that is a member of both organisations would undoubtedly feel a greater sense of belonging to the EU than NATO, so it is of great significance that the EU builds on this image of diversity and culture and demonstrates this around the world.
From Telegraph to Twitter: Arms Control Diplomacy in the Information Age
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
January 17, 2012
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/180820.htm
The Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of Arms Control describes in this report the changes in Diplomacy and how technology and innovation have changed the conditions for statecraft in the 21st century. She takes the facts back in the telegraph and perhaps the beginning of printed press era where diplomats discussed treaties in ‘smoked filled rooms across green baize tables, among grizzled diplomats with endless amount of time’.
Besides accelerating diplomacy missions, technology also centralized foreign policy by reducing the independence of diplomats. Analysing the past and how diplomacy was handled and the way diplomats behaved, one cannot argue the changes that influenced and changed the nature of the diplomatic service.
What in the past involved diplomats sending short expensive telegraphs messages, today governments have a whole new range of tools to keep diplomatic relations: media, internet, social networks (Tweeter and Facebook) and meetings all over the world.
The Secretary mentions the downside of such rapid technological advancements. Leaders suffer from lack of time to reflect and pressure on decision-making for important issues and also electronic threats (internet not being the safest place to keep government’s secrets).
Gottemoeller mentions also Hillary Clinton and her successful attributions to this new era of technological advancement. Virtual embassies were opened trying to access the world and to spread the American culture and engage the targeted country. The so called civil society 2.0 incorporates a younger generation with a higher set of skills in computing to deal with this new way of keeping relationships.
Professional hackers are now an important element to help governments solving virtual issues and barriers. Social networks also play a very special part in nowadays communication. Tweeter was used by an American diplomat asking for help in Japan after an earthquake.
The Bureau of Arms Control is able to detect the difference on the way treaties were dealt with before internet and other innovations and how they are managed in today’s reality. The Secretary compares the negotiations of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in 1991 signed by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev and the renegotiations that are happening now. A diplomatic atmosphere of respect took over the negotiations. Emails and electronic technology is used to accelerate the process. Information is clear and published in fast pace in online news media and social networks.
To the future
No matter how fast technology advances and emails take over telegrams, diplomats must be attentive and careful with being ‘too advanced’ and forget to act diplomatically. Governments and the media have to be thoughtful and sometimes take a step back and let things fall in place not rushing the decision-making process. She concludes asking for ideas from readers on how to incorporate new technologies into arms control diplomacy.
There is not a great difference between old diplomacy and new diplomacy besides technological advancement. Diplomacy will always exist to negotiate, promote culture and maintain peaceful international relations among international actors. Technology moves in a fast pace and can be used with caution in favour of governments. Wrong doing can be easily detected anywhere in the world with special technology. But diplomats must remain diplomats not robots. They can have use of many different tools to facilitate their jobs but diplomacy cannot be only an exchange of emails and Facebook updates but an exchange of respect, dialogue, understanding and cooperation.
When Cull drew seven lessons for the future of public diplomacy from its past, one of the lessons he pointed out was “public diplomacy is not a performance for domestic consumption”, meaning that governments should not use their diplomatic efforts abroad as a way of impressing domestic constituencies.[1]
However, while engagement with the public at home in this fashion may be rightfully criticized, in the same article, Cull concedes that public diplomacy is not the exclusive preserve of paid government officials, but highlights the importance of citizen and people to people diplomacy, especially with regards to conveying a positive brand message.[2] Accordingly, it seems that recent considerations of the ‘new public diplomacy’ include a new focus on domestic populations.
Writing with a specific focus on the nation branding aspect of public diplomacy, Tatevossian also recognized this in her 2008 article, by emphasising that home constituencies not only play a vital role in the projection a certain brand image through their interactions with foreign audiences, but, more importantly, that any brand image must realize and respect who the domestic society is and what they believe in. Citing Fiona Gilmore, she establishes this as the first rule of branding:
“The important thing to realize about branding a country is that it must be an amplification of what is already there and not a fabrication… The country’s brand should be rooted in reality and in fundamental truths about the destination”[3]
Thus, seeing that only a reality-based brand image will generate trust and have credibility abroad, governments need to find a way to respond to the breakdown of the distinction between the domestic and the foreign, which Riordan identifies as a main component of 21st century challenges for foreign services. He envisages a greater, more comprehensive engagement with domestic civil society in order to identify ‘what is already there’ to improve the credibility and thus the impact of public diplomacy initiatives abroad.[4] Seeing effective public diplomacy at home as essential for success abroad, he imagines diplomats taking on the new role of “diplomatic entrepreneurs” working to establish networks with non-state actors at home, which will facilitate access to civil society abroad where opportunities for dialogue and cooperation can be more easily established.[5]
Bátora, too, advocated the idea of networks between foreign ministries and a broad set of stakeholders at home. By conceding that “value and image assets that constitute the basis of a state’s attractiveness are embedded within societal actors of the respective state,” he suggested that non-state actors needed to be convinced to become associated with states in order for them to harness their soft power potential.[6] However, looking at Canada as an example, Bátora found that the lack of interest in foreign policy had a negative effect on consensus about meaningful goals and values which made it difficult for foreign ministries to identify commonalities with civil society.[7] In line with Gilmore’s first rule, the Canadian foreign ministry undertook two large-scale initiatives to identify the domestic constituency’s priorities for diplomatic initiatives. The two campaigns, making use of modern technology, such as web-based debates, generated broad and positive input from the population and helped in establishing contact points with main societal stake holders at home, but their ultimate impact on foreign policy is still ambiguous, with the final report about the initiatives receiving but “meagre attention.”[8]
Thus, what is the role of the domestic population in the new public diplomacy? Their importance has been increasingly recognized and the idea of networks with civil society, is spreading, yet there seems to be little consensus about the methods of engagement and more research into this topic is needed.
Still, the importance of a successful domestic dialogue has been underlined by Henrikson: If countries are able to identify issues to focus on which are “reflective of deep social interest and responsive to the prevailing public sentiment of a country,” it is possible to create a broad home support basis for activities – such as peacekeeping in Norway – which also increases their legitimacy abroad.[9]
[1] Cull, Nicholas J., ‘Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons For its Future From its Past’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6.1 (2010), p.15
[2] Ibid., p.15
[3] Tatevossian, Anoush Rima, ‘Domestic Society’s (often-neglected) Role in Nation Branding’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4.2 (2008) , 183
[4] Riordan, Shaun, ‘Reforming Foreign Services for the Twenty-First Century ‘, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2.2 (2007), p.165 and p.168
[5] Riordan, Shaun, ‘Reforming Foreign Services for the Twenty-First Century ‘, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2.2 (2007), p.166 and p.168
[6] Bátora, Jozef, ‘Public Diplomacy Between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1.1 (2006), p.59
[7] Ibid., p.56
[8] Ibid., p.66
[9] Alan K. Henrikson, ‘Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway’, p.72
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme has generated support and condemnation, cause divisions amongst members of the international community, as well as create a perception of a state of instability within the international political and economic sphere.
TheUnited Statesand its allies (UK, France,Germany, andIsrael) have, in their respective bids to acquire public opinion (and international legitimacy), resort to public diplomacy to win the hearts and minds of both national and international audiences. Indeed, bearing in mind that memories ofIraqare still very fresh in the public’s mind, it is therefore no rocket science that opponents ofIran’s nuclear programme, concentrate on, and place much emphasis on informing, as well as indoctrinating members and citizens of the international community.
Moreover, despite of the unsavoury rhetoric and threats, there now appears a recognition (at least behind close doors) that Iran’s nuclear programme can not be meaningfully addressed or resolved through military coercion, but rather through dialogue and other peaceful resolutions. For whether opponents of Iran’s nuclear programme can militarily partially destroy its nuclear site is not doubted but whether they can cause collateral damage to Iran’s nuclear site is very questionable. Indeed, in echoing the Director of US National Intelligence James R. Clapper, “An Israeli bombing attack might only set back Iran’s nuclear development program by one to two years.” (Press TV, 2012). In a similar development, the former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden asserted that Israellacks the capability of inflicting significant damage on Iran’s nuclear sites, and that any Israeli attack on Iranonly has the ability to make matters worse (Dilanian, K. (2012). U.S. intelligence chief sees limited benefit in an attack on Iran). Hayden further noted that even a month-long bombing assault by theUnited States would not be worth it.
Indeed, the battle is more a contest of winning public opinion and the moral high ground than military strength. Iran, occupying a strategic geopolitical area (the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which, daily, 40% of the world’s oil exports pass) thus, also advances the need for a peaceful resolution to the dispute. As such, opposing factions have realised that the only way of winning this battle is through diplomatic means (i.e. gathering moral support from the emerging and influential national regional bodies like the African Union, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their peoples.
According to Los Angeles Times, most experts argue that Iranian scientists now possess enough technological know-how so that no air campaign, not even sustained bombing by US forces, could destroyIran’s ability to someday produce a nuclear weapon should it choose to do so. This shows that irrespective of all the proposed contingency measures, a public diplomacy aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear programme is not only fundamental, but also appears to be the only means to a peaceful and successful solution to the Iranian nuclear programme.
Since it appears to the leaders of the international community that citizens of the global World have no appetite for a potential Third World War or Second Cold War, both factions have turned to the Fourth Estate as they seek to maximise the CNN effect to their advantage. Thus, the process of seeking to promote and enhance the national interest of both Iran, the United States and its allies (Israel, UK, France, Germany) have now become the primary, and perhaps, as the current nature of the international environment suggests, the only way that both factions can claim a genuine victory. Public diplomacy is, in this case, the only means to a successive and effective outcome.
“Just as non-proliferation is vital to the US, the peaceful use of nuclear technology is valued in Iranas an inalienable right” (Salsabili, M. (2012). “Iran Talks: Why Time is Ripe for Compromise)”. As such a diplomatic negotiation aimed at both addressing the suspicions, and providing a fair and constructive settlement is the only long-term solution to this international phenomenon.
Furthermore, that Iran has the right to a peaceful nuclear programme is not the bone of contention, but whether its nuclear programme has military objectives, seems to be the cause of concern to some members of the international community. As such, this inherent suspicion, misunderstanding, misinformation and misrepresentation can, and will undoubtedly be remedied not by the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), Boeing B-52 Stratofortress and ICBMs, but by a readiness for respectful diplomatic engagement by both factions.
REFERENCES
PRESS TV. (2012). Israeli attack on Iran, unlikely: Clapper. Available: http://www.presstv.ir/detail/227198.html. Last accessed 29th Feb 2012.
Salsabili, M. (2012). “Iran Talks: Why Time is Ripe for Compromise”. Available: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21939/iran_talks.html. Last accessed 14th April 2012
Dilanian, K. (2012). U.S. intelligence chief sees limited benefit in an attack on Iran. Available: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/16/world/la-fg-iran-israel-bombing-20120217. Last accessed 21st April 2012.
Dilanian, K. (2011). Iran has technical means to make nuclear bomb, IAEA says. Available: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/world/la-fg-iran-nuclear-report-20111108. Last accessed 21st April 2012.
Klare, M. (2005). Oil, Geopolitics, and the Coming War with Iran. Available: http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/2312/michael_klare_on_blood_oil_and_iran. Last accessed 21st April 2012
I cannot disagree with the fact that citizen diplomacy is somehow influential, positive and successful in many occasions. There are many citizens, with no interests, that help only for the sake of helping and trying to do their part in helping those in need.
I agree that Peace Corps is an important independent actor that is part of Public Diplomacy and has great results. However, as any other independent actor, it seems to have its negative points:
“In January 2010, the issue of safety and security received renewed public attention due to reports on the ABC television newsmagazine 20/20, one concerning the 2009 murder of volunteer Kate Puzey in Benin and the other addressing the rape of volunteers. The stories catalogued incidents illustrating failure of some Peace Corps staff to maintain whistle-blower confidentiality, inaction in response to volunteer reports of threatening behaviour, a lack of compassion for victims of crime, a tendency to blame the victim, and insensitivity to the parents of a crime victim.” (TARNOFF: 2012)
*I was not able to comment under the post.
(Peace Corps Volunteer, http://www.peacecorps.gov/)
The US Center for Citizen Diplomacy makes the following distinction between Public Diplomacy and Citizen Diplomacy:
“Public diplomacy is conducted through activities and programs carried out under the auspices of the federal government that promote positive and credible perceptions of the US generally, and of US foreign policy specifically.”
“Citizen Diplomacy is the engagement of individual American citizens in primarily voluntary, private sector programs and activities that increase cross-cultural understanding and knowledge between Americans and people from other countries, leading to greater mutual understanding and respect.”
With this in mind there is the belief that Citizen Diplomacy is the concept that the individual has the right, even the responsibility, to help shape US foreign relations ‘one handshake at a time’.
The Peace Corps are a good example of international, independent actors who we can bring into the Public Diplomacy paradigm. The general consensus is that volunteers of the Peace Corps do engage in Public diplomacy as they are employed by the US Government. The aims of the Peace Corps generally compliment the aims of US Public Diplomacy, especially in regard to Morocco and Jordan where the focus is on democracy, freedom and the environment.
The fundamental power and credibility of the Peace Corps stems from the fact that they have separation in policies to the US Government and they focus on other projects than Public Diplomacy projects; the Peace Corps is not required to align their goals with any US agency strategy. The State Department agrees that separation form the US Government is crucial to the credibility of the Peace Corps, but also that they are beneficial to winning objectives. This separation from the embassy means Public Diplomacy officials cannot influence volunteer’s activities or words so they cannot be considered a direct Public Diplomacy tool. Peace Corps Volunteers are not primarily public diplomats as they have other goals, for example development. Their credibility is crucial to the region as the biggest issues faced by US Public affairs officers in the Middle East is the opposition to American Foreign Policy.
Therefore, the Peace Corps volunteers are allowed to wield a great deal of credibility even though they are hired by the government. This is because they stay for a relatively long time, they become intimately involved in the communities and they are not told what to say and as independent actors they are not told to encourage US policies.
In the Peace Corps Performance and Accountability Report (2011) the volunteers are shown to have immense impact on the community they are working in through the following indicators:
83% of volunteers used their skills daily/weekly outside work (so impacting on a grander scale)
93% saw their daily interaction causing change
70% were able to maintain a change
It was also published that one of the strategic goals was to foster outreach to Americans through the agency programs that assist volunteers and ‘returned Peace Corps Volunteers’ which help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans. Volunteers are considered to be ‘goodwill ambassadors’ overseas on behalf of the American people, and they also bring their experiences back home to increase American’s awareness and knowledge of other cultures and global issues.
http://uscenterforcitizendiplomacy.org/
http://multimedia.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/annrept2011.pdf
Rugh, W. A., The Practice of Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan, USA, 2011
What is the role and importance of soft power in the international environment? Obama states that power does not come simply from military but from values. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hunger and poverty are some of the world’s problem and cannot be solved by hard power and only by an agreement of the international community on such issues that affects many around the world.
Soft power is much more applied nowadays. Smart power needs to be used – the combination of soft and hard power.[1] Business is about relationships and based on trust and understanding. Cultural and public diplomacy is directly related to soft power, where countries/sates/cities promote policies on the hope that others will adopt.
USA is an example of extensive use of cultural and public diplomacy with the target of spreading the ‘American way’ of life around all corners of the world, especially after the attacks of 9/11. In many ways, they are successful. American music, Hollywood, art and food are known everywhere. But, certain episodes in cultural diplomacy sometimes are taken as threats (Arab world) and some cultures are also afraid of losing their identity if a strong influence such as the American is accepted freely into their country.
Culture is an interesting way of getting to know another country and technology makes much easier for anyone to have access to another way of life. And, nations are interested in having people to know their language, food, art and hoping to be attractive enough for people to want to come to their cities and have a great impression. Nation branding plays part on making themselves attractive for other people to be interested in their culture.
This continuous cultural relationship is what makes the world rotate. People come and go, accept other cultures, learn languages, build relationships and hoping that one day this relationship between nations will be strong enough to end the suffering of those in need.
[1] The Wall Street Journal, Mark Donfried talks to Simon Constable about soft power, The Wall Street Journal (19/04/2012)
Reference:
Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy, http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org (19/04/2012)
The Latin country will host the next world cup bringing excitement to those who want to be involved in the ceremony. The major sporting event will put Brazil in the spotlight for a few weeks and the country has been doing its part in investing and promoting the football event to bring the world’s attention to what Brazil has to offer.
Brazil is well known around the world for their football techniques and players that are considered peerless in the field. Brazilians players are already ‘branded’ as unique so the country. The propaganda around the coming event to happen in 2014, is confirming the brand that Brazil already had making it simple to attract the eyes of the world to this welcoming nation.
According to Anholt, countries, when promoting their brand, must develop their infra-structure, culture and always promote the reality and not base their public diplomacy on more than they are able to offer. Brazil has several construction work and other infrastructural projects in the twelve cities that will be hosting matches in 2014. The World Cup is a great opportunity to advertise Brazil as a tourist destination and also offers a chance to showcase their positive image in a broader sense.
* Arena Amazonas is being constructed in 2013 in Manaus with capacity of 42.374 people.
However, Anholt adds the danger of such major event in damaging the image of the host country. [1]
London 2012 will be an example for the Brazilian to be successful in the coming years in hosting two major sporting events. London has been using the event to promote them as the place to be this summer. The Olympics is a great opportunity to attract worldwide attention and to have a ‘brand’ celebrated and known.
[1] Simon Anholt, “Brazil TV Interview with Simon Anholt”, http://globotv.globo.com/globo-news/jornal-das-dez/v/criador-de-raking-dos-paises-afirma-que-imagem-do-brasil-pode-piorar-depois-da-copa/1638007/ (18/04/2012)
References:
Embassy od Brazil in London, “Preparations underway for 2014 World Cup”, http://www.brazil.org.uk/press/pressreleases_files/20090723.html (18/04/2012)
Anholt, S., Places: identity, image and reputation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010
VOICES OF AMERICA: U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.
Author: Kristin M. Lord (2008).
The United States of America had a good reputation before but today its image has been tarnished due to its foreign policies and because of its activities such as the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Anti-American attitude today hinders the United States of America from achieving its national interests. Terrorism is a constant threat to the country and ways are being sought to influence the foreign public by portraying a good image of the country. The report under review is a result of a research carried out to find better ways of correcting the mistakes made by the United States as regard to its foreign policy. The report therefore gives recommendations on what needs to be done.
The report, entitled Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century, written by Kristin M. Lord, recommended the establishment of a new public private organisation called ‘The U.S.A.- World Trust’. The organisation purpose is to complement the efforts of the government to portray America’s ideals such as justice, tolerance, democracy, community and freedom, to the foreign governments and publics.
The report expressed concern with U.S.’s efficiency in engaging, persuading and attracting the cooperation of the foreign public. It noted that “what U.S. government does, is not what it says and that gives questionable perceptions of the country” (Lord, 2008). The country needs to maintain a moral authority and trust, and should use policies which are in line with America’s ideals so as to advance the country’s interests.
The report recommended the establishment of ‘the U.S.A.- World Trust’ to carry out five activities: First, to carry out research and analysis using expert’s knowledge which can be of use to public diplomacy. Second, to use the private sector by involving companies, non-governmental organisations, universities, and other individuals to handle new innovative undertakings. Third, to offer grants and venture capital to works that may help the Trust fulfil its objectives. Forth, to identify, cultivate, and experiment with new technologies and media products that support U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication. Fifth, to use practitioners from U.S. government, scholars, and the talented visiting persons from the private and non-profit organisations so as to handle public diplomacy and communication matters. The report acknowledged the existence of vicious ideologies which are used to perpetrate violence which put U.S. and its allies in danger both at home and abroad. The report therefore outlined the ways in which U.S. may engage, persuade and attract support from the public in other countries.
However, the report mostly outlined what are needed to be done to promote America’s image abroad. It does not touch on the root causes of why U.S. today have negative image on the international scene and why terrorists target the country. Anti-Americanism is assumed to be stopping national security and compromising diplomacy. Fear of attacks, losing friends and influence preoccupy America. America needed to realise that its foreign policies and the way it conduct itself is what isolate it from the rest of the world. The scenarios of the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay arguably give credence to anti-Americanism. Whatever is stipulated in the report is ambitious but one sided, and seeks no solution, since it does not involve the other side of the warring party, namely the terrorists. America is seeking for an international environment of understanding, respect, and trust so as to pursue common interests but not the interests of other people including the terrorists.
In conclusion, the United States of America seems to realise where it has gone wrong but failed to go further in addressing the root causes of terrorism. The report is over ambitious and suggested ways to influence the foreign public. But these efforts still isolates a huge section of the world societies who think that war on terrorism is an attack on their community, the Muslim. Unless America talk to all people including terrorists the efforts the country is putting in its public and cultural diplomacy, as depicted in the report under review, will be futile.
“Freedom of expression” is a global topic of debate and is often a tool used in a bid to win over a foreign or domestic audience. This issue has been of increasing significance in the Post-Cold War World due to the emergence of more democracies and therefore better accessibility to reach out to publics.
Encompassed within this debate is the “war of ideas” (Rolfe, 2009). This has moved on from the battle of Cold War ideologies and has been shaped by the events of 9/11. The US launched its “strategic communication/information warfare” (Rolfe, 2009) to counter the negative feelings directed towards them. This was carried out through a form of public and cultural diplomacy as the US aimed to project their culture, policies and political values through the media. The Arab world however developed a mistrust of this type of state-sponsored media, an issue exacerbated during the Danish cartoon controversy.
The Danish Cartoon controversy transcended national boundaries as “the local and complex were ignored for the global and absolute”. The escalation of the problem can be attributed to technology and media globalisation, a result of our networked world (Rolfe, 2009).
Our clashing taboos; religion, democracy, freedom of speech etc. cannot be expected to transcend borders in the same way. However through public and cultural diplomacy our tolerance of such taboos will be encouraged, as long as efforts are made by a state before an incident (such as the Danish Cartoon controversy) has the opportunity to take over a country’s reputation in such a negative way.
Rolfe, M., Clashing taboos: Danish cartoons, the Life of Brian and public diplomacy, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 4 (2009) 261-281
According to Edmund Gullion, Public Diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It is seen as encompassing elements of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy and involves the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of non-state actors and interest groups in one country with another and the process of intercultural communications.
Place/Nation branding is relatively a new and less well understood concept. The two concepts from an analytical perspective might be mistaken for simply two version of the same idea. While Public Diplomacy can be understood more from an international relations perspective, place branding can be better explained through a commercial angle.
Simon Anholt suggests that PD is in fact a subset of Nation Branding and argues that that nation branding deals with consideration about how the nations as a whole represent itself to other. On the other hand, PD is seen to concentrate exclusively on the presentation and representation of government policy to other publics. Accordingly, his theory of nation branding claims government policy being simply on point of the ‘hexagon’ of nation brand. Insofar from this point of view, PD is a component of nation branding which attempts to harmonise policy, people, sports and culture, products, t0urism, trade and investment promotion and talent recruitment etc. (Anholt 2006:2).
To evaluate the intricacies of PD and the nation branding one ought to distinguish between the difficulties in managing public and on other hand professional opinion. While professional diplomats are or should be prepared to change their mind about another country at any time according to most informed and balanced view, public’s responses to government policies are seen likely to be conditioned substantially by their perceptions of the country as a whole (Anholt 2006: 3). As such government are now embracing guidance in this area from commerce in terms of creating wide scale changes in opinion and behaviour taking the importance of persuasion rather than coercion, attraction rather than compulsion as an essence of branding and marketing. From this perspective to best represent a country and achieve its aims in modern world a mature and sophisticated blend of PD and nation branding is seen crucial.
Depending on the degree of integration between the two concepts, Szondi suggest five conceptual models. The first view suggests that PD and nation branding not sharing any common ground and unrelated. In other views it is maintained that the concepts are related and different degrees of possible integration are identified. The final view sees both concepts being synonyms. Nevertheless, it is identified that public diplomacy being an interdisciplinary study needs the different disciplinary insights to be integrated. It is also suggested that more integration and cooperation being needed not only between the concept of nation branding and PD o achieve better synergy, but between practitioners and scholars from both spheres to further enhance the theoretical practical bases of the fascinating areas of PD and nation branding discourse. (Szondi 2008).
Bibliography:
Anholt, S (2006), ‘Public diplomacy and place branding: where’s the link? ‘Place branding’ Vol.2, 4, 271-275. Palgrave Macmillan.
Szondi, G (2008), ‘ Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences’ ‘Discussion Papers in Diplomcy’, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ ISSN 1569-2981.
The broadest definition of ‘track two diplomacy’ refers to interactions among individual or groups that take place outside an official negotiation process. Therefore, it can be states that while ‘track one’ refers to all official, governmental diplomacy, track two describes all other activities that occur outside official government channels.
For Louise Diamond and John McDonald, track two refers to ‘non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called ‘non-state actors’ (Kaye 2005). Nevertheless this kind of definition lacks precision and is too broad which could mean any non-governmental activity constituting track two, including business contacts, citizen exchange programs, advocacy works or religious contacts.
Arguably, Harold Saunders suggests that track two diplomacy involves citizens who engage in ‘policy-related , problem-solving dialogue’ where they may discuss elements of overall political relationship, solutions to arms control problems, resolution of regional conflicts, issues of trade policy or other areas contention to name a few. Insofar, according to Saunders, this is distinct from ‘people-to-people diplomacy where objective is mainly to knowing the other side and developing personal experiences with one’s adversaries rather than finding problems (Kaye 2005, p 10).
In light of above assessment one can analyse the diplomatic environment that gave rise to the new series of diplomacies conducted by non-state actors. It is now widely accepted and attested by diplomacy reports from Think Tank such as United States Institute of Peace (UPIS, 1996-2000), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 1998), and Wilton Park that the diplomatic environment has transformed and that , in Jan Smuts’s words, ‘Humanity is once more on the march’ (Sharp 2001). The transformation of such environment is seen due to revolutions in information and communication technologies, together with the worldwide rise in democratic expectations as a result of the two revolutions. This has been suggested as an era where the ordinary person has finally arrived in the international relations.
The importance of such people to people relations is exemplified by a Foreign Policy Centre flyer capturing the mood of Britain stating ‘building the links with overseas publics will matter as much as talking to government in the age of global communications” but that ‘’we won’t reach millions through diplomatic channels”. To achieve this,
[t]he Foreign Office must unleash the energy of 60 million budding ambassadors in Britain’s schools, businesses, local authorities, political parties, and communities. (Leonard and Alakeson, 2000:5).
However one can argue that evaluation of the impact such ambassadors or citizen diplomacy makes is both analytically and conceptually a challenging task. Are the citizen diplomats just pushing forward their respective national interest even if there is an element of global citizenship?
Bibliography:
Sharp, P., ‘Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats: The People of Duluth, Minnesota, as International Actors’ in International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001
Available from http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&hid=105&sid=71e4768b-37cc-47a1-93d8-a3c03f9b06dc%40sessionmgr111
Kaye, D. D (2005), ‘Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia’, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050601_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_3_kaye.pdf
US Center for Citizen Diplomacy. (http://uscenterforcitizendiplomacy.org/pages/what-is-citizen-diplomacy/)
Some conflicts have been going on for so long and are so intractable that solving them seems nigh impossible – even when you are on speaking terms with your adversaries. In the Middle East, however, the situation is yet more complex. Due to the length, depth and past violence of the conflict, relations between the different parties are tense or non-existent, with some parties not recognizing each other and accordingly, without diplomatic representation.[1]
When official channels break down, informal modes of communication become of vital importance. Montville, credited for having coined the term, defines Track II diplomacy as “unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion […] in ways that might help resolve the conflict.”[2] Taking this definition as a starting point, some equate Track II with citizen diplomacy, while Kaye is outspoken about why such a definition is misleading and too vague: Citizen diplomacy is about getting to know the other side and developing personal experiences with ‘the enemy’, she argues, while Track II only classifies as such if talks are held with the aim of addressing policy problems in order to contribute to the resolution of a conflict.[3]
Also, the participants are not just some ‘Average Joe’, but usually involve scholars, senior journalists, former government officials, and former military officers.[4] Meeting in a non-binding environment is supposed to allow participants to reduce tensions by developing common threat perceptions, clarifying disputes and exploring ways to solve them, ultimately leading to a new way of thinking about both the opponent and the conflict.
In the Middle East Track II talks have a long history, culminating in the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Talks, where unofficial negotiations brought about a breakthrough agreement, fostering reconciliation between the two people. Looking at more recent events, however, hope for influencing concrete policy measures has dwindled. The Track II talks which accompanied official discussions about arms control in the 1990s, did well in contributing to the growing ACRS expertise in the region, yet when the official negotiations failed, Track II stayed alive, but retained little policy influence. For despite their informality, Track II talks are still vulnerable to a deteriorating political climate, leading to deadlocks and disappointment.
Further criticisms include the feeling amongst officials that “amateurs” should not engage in activities which could damage the diplomatic process by raising unrealistic hopes,[5] and others cite the ‘autonomy dilemma’ as a problem since “the more autonomous Track Two is of governments, the more freedom it has, but the less immediate and measurable its impact, and vice versa.”
Yet, Kaye is convinced that “transmission”, i.e. translation of the Track II-developed ideas into official policies, is only the last step in a long process, which has an independent value in itself. For only through continuous engagement and cooperation with ‘the other’ can perceptions change and new ways of cooperative win-win thinking can emerge.[6] This may not seem like a major breakthrough, but in a region where enemies are still often stereotyped, and where realist zero-sum thinking prevails, those are vital steps.
[1] Kaye, D. D., ‘Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia’, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 3, 2005, available at www.clingendael.nl/cdsp/publications/diplomacy-papers/archive.html, p.1 and p.10
[2] J.V. Montville, ‘Transnationalism and the Role of Track-Two Diplomacy’, in W.S. Thompson et al. (eds), Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1992) p.255
[3] Kaye, D. D., ‘Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia’, op.cit., p.6
[4] Agha, H. et al, Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003) p.1
[5] See Cynthia J. Chataway, 1998, “Track II Diplomacy from a Track I Perspective”, Negotiation Journal, vol. 14, no. 3
[6] D.D. Kaye, 2007, Talking to the Enemy; Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG592.pdf
As she seeks for (greater) recognition outside her frontiers, the republic of Taiwan (to her allies) or the republic of China (to China and her allies) has, embark on a public and cultural diplomacy campaign aimed at gaining recognition from members of the international community. Her bid for a formal recognition from nation states and her quest for her reinstatement to the boards and organizations of councils of states (i.e. her bid to regain her UN seat which it lost to China in 1971) has led to a public diplomacy offensive against the Peoples Republic of China (who regard Taiwan a territory of China). In their bids to garner support and cement bilateral relations with developing countries, both nations have in recent times concentrated on, and intensified their activities in developing countries.
No where are the remnants or ramifications of China and Taiwan’s public diplomacy tussle more evident than in the pacific countries of Samoa and Tonga. These small and poor (but useful countries to both China and Taiwan) have in recent times endure the repercussions of the public diplomacy machinery of China and Taiwan. With very few formal diplomatic ties as a result of China’s insistence that it is part of her territory, Taiwan has literally, resorted to buying or winning her way to organizations of councils of states at all cost. Indeed, in her attempt to regain her UN seat, it has donated (or surrendered) significant amounts of money and resources to political apparatuses and political personnels in exchange for their support of her political goal. Indeed, Taiwan’s inability to join the United Nations or sign free-trade deals with other countries because of objections from China (Cindy Sui, 2010), and the reach and power of her long term traditional enemy (China) has forced her to resort to these diplomatic tactics. As a result of this financial incentive, the leadership of countries like Samoa and Tonga are only motivated by the financial incentives (pay checks made by Taiwan which usually find themselves in the personal bank accounts of prominent political and powerful figures) rather than the interests of their respective nations in general. As an Asian Tiger, Taiwan has managed to buy the hearts and minds of the rulers of these countries at the detriment of their citizens.
Furthermore, China’s economic offers are in echoing Edward Friedman, extremely effective because almost all of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners are poor and small Pacific island, African, and Latin American countries. Indeed, China’s current economic prowess and political power has drove Taiwan (who tries to contain China and maintain her diplomatic relations) to resort to diplomatic tactics that undermines or threatens the social fabric of the societies of the developing world. In sum, Taiwan and China’s diplomatic charm offensive has to a great extent, helped in fuelling corruption and public sector malpractice in the developing world.
References
Sui, C. (2010). Taiwan at crossroads in relationship with China. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10122592. Last accessed 4th March 2012
Friedman, E (2006). China’s rise, Taiwan’s dilemmas and international peace. New York: Routledge. p50-65.
Since the deportation verdict in favour of Abu Qatada was passed by the European Court of Human Rights, the values, principles and laws enshrined within our un-codified constitution, and cherished so dearly by Westminster and her electorate have, being a subject of criticism rather than of standard protocol. The process of compromising British ideals for the sake of complementing a fleeting public opinion has not only question the British resolve (and the notion of Britishness) but also, suggests that in a time like this, when courage and tolerance, and respect for British ideals, norms and values (justice and fairness) should be embraced and guarded, it rather becomes secondary, relegated to the periphery and deliberately (as instigated by the media), opened to different interpretations – contextualize for the sole purpose of exploiting very unattractive loopholes or outcome. Abu Qatada may have seem to possess views, opinions, values and principles that differs from those of his host nation (the UK) – ideals that are (to some) regarded as extremists and inflammatory, and as such, threatens the national security of the United Kingdom. However, the conduct and behaviour of the Westminster government i.e. the public diplomacy about Abu Qatada leaves nothing to be admired for and thus, serves as an assault on British values and rule of law (justice and fairness). Indeed, the ruling by the law lords (the highest court in the land and the supreme court of appeal) that he can be extradited to Jordan in spite of fears that he may be subjected to torture in Jordan (a country known for her miscarriage of justice) thus reinforces the notion of ‘a gradual erosion of and an assault on the British rule of Law’.
Moreover, with the Abu Qatada case being a high profile case, and one brought forward by the Jordanian government (Jordan vs. Abu Qatada), it can only be assumed that such a case will most definitely be outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts that are more independent, fair and impartial. As such, the case will be heard by the State Security Court where ‘defendants are often held in lengthy incommunicado pre-trial detention and where there have been frequent allegations of the use of torture to extract confessions’ (George A, 2005). In addition, according to the renowned human rights watch group Amnesty International, ‘often State Security Court does not provide the same guarantees of independence and impartiality provided by the ordinary courts.’
In sum, the public diplomacy campaign aimed at legitimizing a potential miscarriage of justice in this case is, judging by the UK government’s historical positive stance on human rights, not only hypocritical but also sets a very dangerous precedence both at home and abroad. As an extract from the Guardian Newspaper puts it:
“If May deports Othman in defiance of the Strasbourg court, she sends a message to repressive forces across Europe: “Do what you want: human rights courts cannot stop you!”. Russia can deport human rights defenders to Uzbekistan to face torture and death. Italy need not worry about the safety of migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Were the British government to defy the European court of human rights, it would forfeit the right to criticize other governments which do the same.”
Human rights and the Abu Qatada case
Guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8th February 2012
The notion of flouting the rule of law to correspond with public opinion and for political ends is, erroneous and unconstitutional. Being under pressure (partly from the ever increasingly powerful and influential British Print media) has forced the UK government to (in order to comply with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights), reach a private settlement with Jordan – a settlement where the notion of genuine rule of law (fairness and justice) will be relegated to the periphery and play second fiddle to public and political demands. As the BBC security correspondent Gordon Corera puts it, ‘there is a lot of pressure on Theresa May (the British Home Secretary) to forge a deal with the Jordanian authorities. The notion of the British government forging a deal with the Jordanian government thus, suggests that Jordan’s existing legal framework is at odds with European standards and strengthens and exacerbates the fears and concerns of the European Court of Human Rights and human rights watch groups that the prospects of a fair trial may be unlikely.
Reference
George, A. (2005). ‘The Basis of Governance’: The Legal System. In: George, A Jordan: living in the cross fire. London: Zed Books Ltd. p190-198
BBC. (2012). Abu Qatada case: Theresa May visits Jordan. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17258054. Last accessed 5th March 2012
The Guardian Newspaper. (2012). Human rights and the Abu Qatada case.Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/08/human-rights-abu-qatada. Last accessed 2nd March 2012.
“For political scientists, one of the interesting questions is whether place branding…entice people to “buy” the “products” of brand state, that is, their foreign policies” (van HAM: 2008)
California is one of the strongest examples one can think of when discussing place branding strategy. The American state uses all tools to make California the best place to visit and live. Their strong marketing on place branding goes beyond slogans and old-fashioned campaigns. Any product can be branded and now places also can have its own brand. But what are the differences when branding a juice and branding a country?
Simon Anholt, British advisor on Nation Branding, tries to differentiate branding a juice and branding a place. That is why Anholt starts using the term Competitive Identity when referring to branding a country. He believes the strategy of branding nations to be completely different from the marketing technique used to sell an orange juice.
Place branding is placed in the same category as public diplomacy in international relations and sometimes criticized for its technics to introduce them abroad. When branding a country, media and marketing specialists come together with the political side and work together in promoting their place across the desired target public.
Another example of on-going place branding is USA after 9/11 (‘war on terror’) and Iraq’s controversial invasion. Slowly, the new American president has been able to change the way the world sees America. But, Obama still has a long way to have the image USA once had before both events listed above happened. In the case of US, they not only sell their tourism, in the words of former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “we’re selling a product. That product we are selling is democracy” (Foreign Policy 2001).
Place branding started becoming important when the amount of money or resources a country had did not matter in the eyes of others but their image and reputation started representing what attracts people to their country. However, a rich country, such as the USA, ranked 1st in Anholt’s research, has more influence abroad for its numerous exports consequently giving there richer nations more political power and influence abroad. That is what builds a country’s image outside their borders.
Place branding can take years to achieve results. But it can certainly help a country to prosper internationally. Factors such as tourism, trade, foreign investments have to function with certain coordination and eventually branding will bring more investors and capital.
Both the World Cup in South Africa and the Olympic Games in Beijing prompted a number of academic articles[1] assessing the suitability of large-scale sports events for nation branding. Unsurprisingly, if we define nation branding as “the strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating reputational capital […] at home and abroad,”[2] it seems logical to consider any event that will focus global attention on a single country as a supreme opportunity to present a new, carefully planned and self-determined image to the world.[3]
While the results were rather ambiguous for both China and South Africa, the effects of the 2006 Fifa World Cup in Germany have received much less academic interest, despite the far-reaching and positive implications for Germany’s image.
Even before the world cup, Germany’s global image was not bad. Germans were widely respected for their efficiency, their civil engineers and high quality technology “made in Germany.” However, national pride was low, its own president diagnosed Germany with collective depression and, while respected for being organised and efficient, Germans were more well known abroad for being “a dour and gray nation of moaners” and, if people were honest, no one wanted to go there on holiday.
Realising that, the Goethe Institute held a brainstorming event with the goal of redefining Brand Germany in 2003. However, believing that the images associated with Germany were too deep-set and considering the typically bad track record of top-down nation branding efforts, commentators saw little chance for success.
Yet, three years later, after the World Cup, there was a sharp rise in Germany’s popularity:
- It reached the most valuable country brand in the Nation Brand Index
- Foreign tourism bookings increased by 31%
- 88% of World Cup visitors would recommend Germany as a tourist destination
- Investors’ confidence was at an all-time high since 1990
- Exports went up 14% year-on-year, making Germany the leading export nation
- Foreign newspapers reported with a new positivity
The question is thus, what set this apart from other nation branding efforts? Why was it so successful? How DID Germany win the World Cup of nation branding?
While some mention the beautiful weather and the great performance of the German team, others mention visitor safety, the introduction of fan festivals and the focus on catering for the visiting media. The truth however, might be best expressed by Anholt’s observation about the importance of getting the local publics on board with the branding message to make it a success: “when a substantial proportion of the population of the country […]gets behind the strategy and lives it out in their everyday dealings with the outside world.”[4]
Germany’s straightforward World Cup brand promise was “A Time to Make Friends” and besides training friendly “service ambassadors”, the World Cup awakened a long suppressed pride in their nation in many Germans, leading them to embrace the positive aspects of their country. Shop assistants were smiling, policemen stroked puppies and everyone was welcome to join into the new-found “partyotism” creating the feeling of a welcoming, fun-loving nation. The lesson to be drawn from this? Nation branding works best if it is genuine and honest – Germans were perceived as being friendly not because of slogans or campaigns, but because they were!
[1] Lee, Annisa Lai, ‘Did the Olympics help the nation branding of China? Comparing public perception of China with the Olympics before and after the 2008 Beijing Olympics in Hong Kong’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol.6, No.3, 2010 and
Youde, Jeremy, ‘Selling the state: State branding as a political resource in South Africa’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol.5, No.2, 2009
[2] Szondi, G., ‘Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences’, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy No. 112, 2008, available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20081022_pap_in_dip_nation_branding.pdf, p.11
[3] Berkowitz, Pere; Gjermano, George; Gomez, Lee and Schafer, Gary, ‘Brand China: Using the 2008 Olympic Games to enhance China’s Image’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol.3, No.2, 2007, p.164 and p.170
[4] Anholt, S. (2003) Brand New Justice: The Upside of Global Branding. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, p.123
California has the 8th largest economy in the world, with $1.8 trillion it is equivalent to the GDP’s of Australia, Burma, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Peru and the Ukraine combined. Its per capita income is higher than the European Union’s and equates to that of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru. California also accounts for 11% of all US exports (29% being computers and electronic products), a combined total equivalent to Denmark, Portugal and Romania of $120 billion in 2009. Home to the largest and oldest trees in the world, beautiful beaches, mountains and vibrant cities, it is no wonder that California has risen to become a power state. (http://visualeconomics.creditloan.com/california-vs-the-world_2010-05-10/)
Californians are not the only ones to contribute to this prosperity however; in 2010 tourism generated $31,940,000 in visitor spending in the rural areas alone supporting 352,000 jobs. The total international tourism expenditure annually is $17 billion supporting 873,000 jobs (http://industry.visitcalifornia.com/Press-Room/Press-Releases/?id=65702). It is to no surprise therefore that in 2011 the ‘California – Find yourself here’ campaign was launched.
In the UK we are used to countries advertising themselves as tourist destinations, we see Turkey advertised on buses, Brazil on taxis, Australia on the TV. However this is an outreach by the state of California to the people of the UK. California is not a country but judging by the above statistics, and by the diversity in activities it has to offer we could be fooled in to thinking it was. (http://www.visitcalifornia.co.uk/)
The Visit California website is much like the tourism site of a country. Here you will find up to date temperature guides, maps and information on the different regions, history, a guide to the currency and visas and accounts of ‘real Californians’. No matter what holiday you want, you can find it here…
For sun-seekers the ‘Golden state’ offers Huntington Beach, if golf is your sport then San Diego alones offers 92 courses, for impressive drives take a car through High Sierra, if culture is your thing then San Francisco is the perfect city, nature lovers are spoilt for choice with national parks, there is nowhere like downtown LA for an exciting nightlife, adrenaline junkies can go rafting through the Sierras, shopaholics can visit Palm springs, for snow sports visit the hundreds of kilometres of snow-capped mountains, those in need of pampering visit Calistoga, children visit Disney, wine-lovers can go to one of 1,000 wineries, and if none of that appeals, then royalists can take advantage of the many festivals happening in commemoration of the wedding of Wills and Kate…
California is working closely with a number of companies and executives from Brand USA, Facebook and Air China to prepare for the year ahead with the 2012 Visit California Outlook Forum in Sacramento. The state has taken advantage of it’s international markets in countries such as Mexico, Canada, Germany and India to make this year even more successful than the last. (http://industry.visitcalifornia.com/Travel-Industry/International-Markets/)
What is national branding about?
National branding, according to Harriet Fildes, “is projecting identity at home and abroad for financial, political or cultural reasons” (Fildes, 2011). It is argued to be important and is used to eliminate cultural divides and stereotyping so as to enhance the perception of a country internationally. It is creating a global opinion by exposing, for example, United Kingdom’s cultural and natural attractions. This would facilitate tourism, education, investment, and visits. It may be argued that nation branding is the way nations try to compete on the global stage by putting out what a country has in terms of culture, opportunities in various fields such as trade, education, tourism and investment (Ibid).
However, there is a distinction between nation branding and brands. For example, in quite a different sense, one may talk of a brand. To understand branding in this sense, one needs to know what ‘brands’ are. It is argued that “a brand is the idea or image of a specific product or service that consumers connect with, by identifying the name, logo, slogan or design of the company who owns the idea or image” (www.brickmarketing.com/define). Furthermore, branding involves marketing the idea or image so that many people would recognise and want the product or the service and also be aware of companies involved. It calls for brand recognition, reputations and standards which are sustained by the company.
Nevertheless, the scope of this piece is nation branding. Gyorgy Szondi argues that having coherent and comprehensive branding of a country may be important, especially for transitional countries. He cited the Central and Eastern European countries which were in transitional region. The Berlin wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Twenty eight countries emerged out of the eight former communist countries. These countries had to position geographically in Europe and the world in term of democracy, political stability and promising market economies. In doing these things those Central and Eastern European countries had to nation-brand themselves individually. It may be argued as moving “from an authoritarian, one-party system into a pluralistic and democratic society which involved a systematic identity and image transformation (Szondi, 2007).
REFERNCES:
Fildes, Harriet, 2011, Nation Branding – the UK, [0n-line], UK, Available from: http://theicdinternvoice.wordpress.com/2011/08/09/nation-branding-the-uk, Accessed 15 March 2012.
Brick Marketing, [0n-line], 2005-2012, Boston Massachusetts: Available from: www.brickmarketing.com/define-branding.htm, Accessed 15 March 2012.
Szondi, Gyorgy, 2007, The Role and Challenges of Country branding in Transition Countries: The Central and Eastern European Experience, [0n-line], UK: Palgrave Macmillan, Available from: www.palgrave.journal.com/pb/journal/v3/n1/full/6000044a.html, Accessed: 15 March 2012.
According to Joseph Nye on Bound to Lead, ‘Soft power works by convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas on the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of other’.
Public diplomacy is used as an instrument for national promotion and it is used more often nowadays but still with limited aspects within traditional diplomacy. While traditional diplomacy is focused on foreign policy where diplomats are sent to other countries with the mission of implementing such policies, public diplomacy is focused primarily on trade promotion or cultural visit. In UK, the British Council is the player using the public diplomacy strategies.
The traditional diplomacy service recognizes recent positive outcomes from public diplomacy positive attempts but it still has barriers along the diplomatic service. This type of diplomacy aims on engage in the political and social debates within a country and it has been showing various successes. This change in the diplomatic approach modifies the traditional way of dealing internationally bringing the debate of what is ‘propaganda’ and what is diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is utilized to promote also political theories and where its values are exposed and hopefully adopted. This type of approach cannot be introduced primarily and only by governments. It involves other players such as NGOs, the private sector and foundations to promote a country. Through public diplomacy the government has the central role to coordinate these different parties and have the plan installed and achieved.
To conclude, public diplomacy has the key secondary role of promoting a country’s interest either political, social or cultural. It is understandable to have traditional diplomacy reluctant of this new type of approach. The traditional school of diplomacy focuses on foreign policy, peace keeping and international negotiation while public diplomacy can be very diverse and could never replace the traditional methods of international relations.
Riordan S., The New Diplomacy, Polity Press, 2003, Chapter 8
What is propaganda?
It is argued that propaganda lacks a collective agreed definition and that there are various competitions of the term. It is a social phenomenon and the meaning is debatable. Arguably it has open-ended definition. The concept of propaganda is in education, arts, bureaucracy, war and journalism (O’ Shaughnessy, 2004: 13-14).
The term ‘propaganda’ was first used in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV in Counter-Revolution. Military methods had failed in Europe and men and women were being coordinated to accept church doctrine (Ibid: 14). Darren points out that it is the oldest form of communication which was used by the Roman Catholic Church in the fight against the rise of Protestantism (Darren, 2006: 162).
It has been argued that propaganda is a process by which an idea or opinion is passed to someone else for a particular purpose. It serves the self-interest of the person or persons passing the information and is often manipulative and is biased. Furthermore, propaganda is also in entertainments, books, government and human activities such as in Shakespeare’s theatre and in the media (O’ Shaughnessy, 2004: 18-34).
Berridge argues that propaganda designed to influence a foreign government is not diplomacy rather it is a form of political advertising. He pointed out that propaganda “is to persuade a foreign government to accept a particular view by winning over to this view those with influence upon it, such as its own general public, the media, pressure groups and foreign allies” (Berridge, 2005: 128). Meanwhile, Nancy Snow (1998: 77) regards propaganda as selling a country’s culture to the world.
Propaganda is described as White, Black or Grey in relation to its source and its accuracy of information. A White propaganda comes from a source which is identified correctly and the information in the message is accurate. For example, the BBC broadcasts or that of Voice of America. Meanwhile, Black propaganda is credited to a false source. It spreads lies, fabrications and deceptions. Furthermore, Grey propaganda is somewhere between white and black (Garth and O’Donnell, 1992: 8-13). The impact of propaganda is, arguably, self-deception and is motivated by affection for some falsehood which results out of exaggeration and manipulation (O’ Shaughnessy, 2004: 45-49).
REFERNCES:
O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas Jackson, 2004, Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Darren, 2006: 162
Berridge, G.R., 2005, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 3rd Edition, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Garth, S and O’Donnell, Victoria, 1992, Propaganda and Persuasion, 2nd Edition, London: Sage Publication Limited.
Nancy Snow, 1998, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America’s Culture to the World, 3rd Edition, New York: Seven Stories Press.
What is cultural diplomacy all about? 
Culture is argued to consist of ideas, customs, and art which are produced and shared by a society. This may include their civilisations and their way of life (Sindair, 1987: 345). According to Turner, culture is the daily lives; what is to wear, hear, watch, eat and how individuals see themselves in relation to other people. It is the aspects of people’s lives which put influence on their existence and the process makes individuals, “as citizens, as members of a particular class, race or gender” (Turner, 1990). Thus the popular culture may be argued to embrace the mass media, sports, arts, dance, threatre, etcetra.
Cultural diplomacy is defined as “shaping the image of a country abroad through education and cultural dimensions of relations between nations” ( Arndt, 2006: ix). This include among others language, cultures, life-style and sharing with others. In pursuit of such goals, for example, United States uses education, art, dance, books, and films to set foreign ideas about its country. It extends values such as democracy and human rights through different ways. It is assumed that such relations would, over time, serve the intereast of United states in building a peaceful, productive and democratic world (Ibid: xi).
Furthermore, Michael Waller, (2007) argues that cultural diplomacy is really the core element of public diplomacy. It is the “linchpin of public diplomacy and it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented.” This may enhance national security and also sustain it through art, dance, film, jazz, and exchange visits which may inspire people globally regarless of political differences.
Some examples of cultural diplomacy played by the United States in the past included goodwill ambassadors in the name of arts sent abroad to promote the image of American culture. Jazz, movies, slang, painting, music and dance touring programmes were used. I pursuit for cultural and political influence, especially in the Third World, non-white artists played important parts. For example, Jazz musicians such as Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington were on many occasions sent to various places abroad to assist counteract the negative publicity about the United States race relations (Prevots, 2001: 5).
It is argued that cultural diplomacy exposes the soul of a nation and enhances trust with other people. Policy-makers can use it to achieve political, economic and military agreements. Through cultural diplomacy nations may reach important members of foreign societies who are not possible to be reached through the traditional embassy channels. This may also give a positive agenda for cooperation even if there are policy differences. It is argued that it creates a neutral situation for people-to-people contacts. Cultural diplomacy may also foster the growth of civil society and may counterbalance misunderstandings, hatred and terrorism. Lastly, but not least, cultural deplomacy may educate on the values and sensitivities of other societies and would help to guard against getting into conflicts (Waller, 2007: 165-66).
REFERENCES:
Sindair, John, 1987, Collins Cobuild Dictionary English Language, London: Collins Publishers.
Turner, Graeme, 1990, British Cultural Studies: An Introduction, London: Unwin Hyman Limited.
Arndt, T. Richard, 2006, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, US: Potomac Books Incorporations.
Waller, J. Michael, 2007, The Public Diplomacy Reader, Washington: The Institute of World Politics Press.
Prevot, Naima, 2001, Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War, USA: Wesleyan University Press.
SEMINAR LOG:
SECTION 1 Seminar Research Findings.
What is public diplomacy?
The United State’s Freedom Promotion Act 2002 defines the term public diplomacy as systematic efforts to communicate with foreign people rather than governments (Von Eschen, 2012: 336). For example, it is argued that after World War Two the United States relied on covert actions and going directly to the people in different countries. Today it has been realised that public diplomacy is emerging as an important mean of influencing foreign people about a country’s culture, values and the potentials for cooperation and engagement in various activities politically, economically and culturally. Furthermore, the global media and technology have made public diplomacy an open communication forum. There are actors now in public diplomacy and these include the individuals, governments, groups and non-governmental organisations.
It may be argued that changes due to advancement in information and communication technology and fast travels enable citizens and non-governmental organisations, together with transnational bodies interact freely, and this is impacting on the ways governments carry out their diplomatic businesses. The changes are causing increased emphasis on new public diplomacy. This therefore may be argued to blur the traditional distinctions between international and domestic information activities. Also between public and traditional diplomacy, and between cultural diplomacy, marketing and news management. (Vickers, 2004: 182). For example, in Britain public diplomacy is argued to involve revising diplomacy to project images to foreign audiences who are treated as passive audiences receiving Western values and way of life.
Meanwhile, in Canada it is argued that the new public diplomacy embraces an inclusive approach to diplomacy and it enables citizens and non-organisations to engage in international affairs. As such, states and the traditional foreign affairs diplomacy no longer the only actors in diplomacy.
REFERENCES:
Von Eschen, Penny M. 2012, Enduring Public Diplomacy, American Quarterly, [On-line], Vol. Issue… Available from: http://0-www.jstor.org.emuy.londonmet.ac.uk/stable/40068268?=3&search=yes&searchText=British&searchText=Diplomacy.
Vickers, Rhiannon, 2004, The New Public Diplomacy: Britain and Canada Compared, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, [On-line], Vol. 6 Issue 2, Available from: http://0-ejscontent.ebsco.com.emulondonmet.ac.uk/ContentServer.aspx?target=http%3A%2F%Frnotlinelibrary%2Ewiley.
Welcome to Public and Cultural Diplomacy, a group blog by students on the eponymous module at London Metropolitan University. Please leave them some comments on their work. They will be pleased to hear from you and to know that their work is being read beyond the campus.
Thank you.
Steven Curtis (s.curtis@londonmet.ac.uk)
Public and Cultural Diplomacy 6 
